Introduction
The rapid rise of o¤shoring, which involves many production and service tasks previously produced domestically being sourced from abroad, has been one of the most visible trends in the US labor market over the last three decades. 1 The share of imported inputs in total intermediate use in the US manufacturing, for example, has increased from about 6% in 1980 to over 27% today (Feenstra and Jensen, 2009 ) and by now intermediate inputs accounts for two thirds of world trade. The production structure of Apple's video iPod gives a glimpse of these trends. Though designed and engineered in the United States, the overwhelming majority of the production jobs created by this product are located abroad (Linden et al. 2011 ). Despite its prevalence, the implications of o¤shoring for wages, skill premia and incomes are still debated. The iPod example illustrates its di¤erent potential e¤ects. Though most production jobs related to the iPod are o¤shored, a signi…cant number of high-skill engineering jobs and lower-skill retail jobs are created in the United States, and more than 50% of the value added of the iPod is captured by domestic companies. With more limited o¤shoring, some of the production jobs may have stayed in the United States, increasing the demand for the services of lower-skill production workers.
The potential negative e¤ects of o¤shoring on incomes and/or the wages of lower-skill workers in advanced economies (the "West") have been emphasized by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , Deardor¤ (2001 Deardor¤ ( , 2005 , Samuelson (2004) and Hira and Hira (2008) , among others. Samuelson, for example, famously pointed out how o¤shoring could lower Western incomes in a Ricardian trade model if it transfers knowledge to less advanced, lower-wage economies (the "East"), thus eroding the Western technological advantage in a range of tasks. Counteracting this are the e¢ ciency gains due to o¤shoring, emphasized by several authors including Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), which potentially bene…t both skilled and unskilled workers in the West.
Our focus in this paper is on the impact of o¤shoring on the direction of technical change and the equilibrium wage structure within the West and between the West and the East. 2 Though there is a vibrant debate on the exact contribution of skill-biased technical change to wage inequality in the United States and other advanced economies, there is a broad consensus that the more rapid rise in the demand for skills than the supply has been at the root of much of it and that more skill-biased technologies, at given factor supplies, tend to increase wage inequality. It is also evident that o¤shoring opportunities should impact the skill bias of technology. We can illustrate this again with the example of Apple products; without the opportunity to o¤shore assembly tasks, it may not have been pro…table for Apple to introduce some of the new varieties of iPods because of the higher labor costs it would have faced. This would have reduced the demand for high-skill engineering and design jobs in Apple, corresponding to the "price e¤ect" which creates a positive link between o¤shoring and skillbiased technical change. Counteracting this, without o¤shoring opportunities, Apple may have designed iPods di¤erently in order to reduce its dependence on expensive domestic unskilled labor, with potentially adverse e¤ects on the demand for unskilled workers in the United States; this illustrates the "market size e¤ect" which creates a negative link between o¤shoring and skill-biased technical change. Our objective is to provide a systematic framework to investigate and quantify these economic channels.
In our model, a unique …nal good is produced by combining a skilled and an unskilled product, each produced from a continuum of intermediates (tasks). O¤shoring takes the form of some of these intermediates being transferred to the East and is subject to both …xed and variable costs. Pro…t-maximizing incentives determine not only how much o¤shoring will take place in equilibrium, but also the rate at which the productivities of both skilled and unskilled sectors improve. An important implication of o¤shoring highlighted by our model is the e¢ ciency-enhancing reallocation of production towards countries where wages are lower. This e¢ ciency e¤ect is stronger when there is little o¤shoring, because the wage gap between the West and the East is greatest in this case. By increasing the demand for labor in the East, greater o¤shoring closes this gap. 3 Our main results concern the e¤ects of o¤shoring on equilibrium technologies. O¤shoring encourages skill-biased technical change by increasing the relative price of skill-intensive products. Simultaneously, it encourages unskilled labor-biased (henceforth, with some abuse of grammar, "unskill-biased") technical change because it expands the market size of technologies complementary to unskilled workers, which can now be used in the East. In the empirically more relevant case where the elasticity of substitution between intermediates (tasks) is greater than the elasticity of substitution between skills and starting from low levels of o¤shoring, the price e¤ect dominates and greater o¤shoring opportunities induce skill-biased technical change. 4 The opposite pattern obtains and o¤shoring induces unskill-biased technical change when the level of o¤shoring is high. This result turns on the Ricardian features of our model: …rst, the e¢ ciency gains are strongest when o¤shoring is limited, and second, o¤shoring closes the wage gap between East and West, and when this wage gap is small, the price e¤ect on the direction of technical change is muted. 5 This con…guration thus yields one of our main qualitative results-an inverse U-shaped relationship between o¤shoring and the direction of technical change. In consequence, o¤shoring will …rst increase wage inequality in the West both through its direct e¤ect and by triggering skill-biased technical change. As o¤shoring continues, however, technical change will eventually change direction and become unskill-biased, thus limiting the increase in wage inequality. Throughout, as expected, o¤shoring also compresses (unskilled) wage di¤erences between the East and the West.
Although our model lacks several important factors shaping wage inequality in the United States (including changes in the domestic supply of skills, institutional factors and other determinants of the types of technologies introduced at di¤erent times), it is nonetheless consistent with the qualitative picture that emerges from several decades of changes in the US wage structure. The …rst wave of expansion of o¤shoring in the 1980s coincided with a sharp decline in the real wages of unskilled workers, but as o¤shoring continued to expand in the late 1990s and 2000s, unskilled wages stabilized and began rising (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor, 2010) . Consistently, our results suggest that the impact of o¤shoring on wage inequality should have been strongest when the volume of trade in intermediates was limited, as in the 1980s. As such, it also circumvents the standard criticism directed at trade-based explanations of inequality that the volume of trade between the United States and developing countries was then too small to have a meaningful impact on wages. 6 The dynamics of technology and wages in response to an expansion of o¤shoring opportunities is also interesting, highlighting that the two activities are substitutes in the short run, but complements in the long run: immediately after the change in o¤shoring opportunities, technical change stops for a while because …rms …rst spend resources to o¤shore their existing intermediates/tasks; this is followed by a phase of either skill-biased technical change (for levels of o¤shoring below a critical threshold) or unskill-biased technical change (for levels of o¤shoring above a critical threshold). Our welfare analysis shows that if the post-o¤shoring equilibrium rate of technical change is su¢ ciently high, then o¤shoring contributes positively to the welfare of all workers. However, because o¤shoring creates a capital loss (by reducing 5 The impact of o¤shoring on the direction of technical change is quite di¤erent than the impact of trade on the direction of technical change. For example, in Acemoglu (2003) trade induces skill-biased technical change when intellectual property rights (IPR) are not enforced internationally, but induces unskill-biased technical change when they are fully enforced. Here because o¤shoring is a voluntary, and thus pro…table, activity for …rms, its qualitative impact on the direction of technical change is independent of international IPR enforcement, though changes in IPR has additional implications for the direction of technical change. Other sources of di¤erences result from the Ricardian aspects of our model which, as explained above, ensure that o¤shoring closes the wage gap between East and West, and from the e¢ ciency e¤ect mentioned in footnote 3. 6 Our model is also broadly consistent both with Bloom et al. (2011) , who …nd that the surge of imports from China from the late 1990s encouraged investments in information technology across European industries, and with Autor et al. (2012) , who show that it also reduced the demand for labor in US local economies heavily exposed to this import competition. the value of existing …rms), it can in principle harm workers in the West (especially, unskilled workers) depending on elasticities and growth rates. In particular, if the post-o¤shoring growth rate is su¢ ciently high, all workers bene…t from o¤shoring, but otherwise both skilled and unskilled workers in the West can lose out. Our quantitative results suggest that while Eastern workers bene…t most and unambiguously, Western unskilled workers are most likely to su¤er as a result of o¤shoring, while Western skilled workers typically obtain limited gains.
The tractability of our framework also enables us to extend it to include the o¤shoring of skilled intermediates. This more general model con…rms the main results discussed so far. It also naturally yields a new result: o¤shoring can increase wage inequality both in the West and the East simultaneously-a possibility that is generally precluded in standard trade models (see Wood, 1994) . This happens because, despite the presence of complete specialization and technological di¤erences across countries, a zero-pro…t condition implies a form of conditional factor price equalization: if o¤shoring costs are identical, pro…t maximization implies that, with o¤shoring, the skill premium has to be the same in the East as in the West. 7 Finally, we study the transition of the East from low-productivity imitation to higher-productivity o¤shoring, which leads to a pattern of transition reminiscent of the Chinese process of economic growth over the last three decades, with productivity gains due to reallocations from imitation to o¤shoring and no wage growth.
Our paper is related to three literatures. First, it is a contribution to the growing literature on o¤shoring already mentioned above. 8 Our main point of departure from this literature is the endogeneity of the direction of technological change. Glass and Saggi (2001) , Naghavi and Ottaviano (2009), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), Branstetter and Saggi (2011), RodriguezClare (2010) and Jakobsson and Segerstrom (2012) endogenize the overall pace of technological change in models with o¤shoring, but not its direction. All of our main results derive from the endogeneity of the direction of technological change and are thus not shared by these papers or others in this literature. 9 Second, our paper is a contribution to the large literature on the theoretical determinants of changes in inequality and wages in the United States and other advanced economies. Our model is closely related to task-based approaches, including Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Autor et al. (2003) and (2008), Costinot and Vogel (2010) , and Acemoglu and Autor (2010). The last paper emphasizes the role of technologies replacing tasks previously performed by labor and the similar role of o¤shoring in this context, but does not model o¤shoring in detail and does not consider the interplay between o¤shoring and directed technological change.
Third, our paper builds on and extends models of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu, 7 These predictions are broadly consistent with the evidence in Sheng and Yang (2012) who …nd that processing exports and FDI explain a large fraction of the recent increase in the Chinese college wage premium. 8 provide a quantitative analysis of the global welfare e¤ect of trade opening and productivity growth in China. 9 Goel (2012) studies the e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages of di¤erent workers in a model with capital-skill complementarity, but without directed technical change. , 2002 , 2007 , Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001 , Kiley, 1999 , Gancia and Zilibotti, 2008 , and especially those linking international trade to the direction of new technologies, including Acemoglu (2003) , Thoenig and Verdier (2003) and Epifani and Gancia (2008) . All three of these papers show how international trade can induce technological changes that further increase the demand for skills, thus amplifying its direct impact on the wage structure. 10 This literature has not, to the best of our knowledge, considered o¤shoring, which has di¤erent e¤ects on labor market equilibria and thus on incentives for technical change. These e¤ects include the impact of o¤shoring on the direction of technical change that is independent of international intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement (as discussed in footnote 5); the non-monotonic relationship between o¤shoring and the direction of technical change which crucially depends on the endogeneity of the gap between wages in the East and the West and thus the extent of the price e¤ect, features related to the Ricardian nature of intermediate trade; and the novel result that stronger IPR enforcement, by reducing the cost of o¤shoring, can trigger skill-biased technical change. 11 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of intermediate/task trade and directed technical change and characterizes the e¤ects of o¤shoring on wages and skill premia for a given level of technology. Section 3 studies the impact of o¤shoring on the direction of technical change and wages. Sections 4 and 5 study transitional dynamics and the welfare e¤ects of a shock to the cost of o¤shoring. Section 6 extends the model to include o¤shoring of high-skill intermediates and imitation. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the omitted proofs.
Model

Environment
The world economy comprises of two countries, West and East, populated by two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, both in …xed supply. The West is endowed with L w units of unskilled workers and H units of skilled workers. The East is assumed to be skill scarce. In particular, we assume that the East has L e unskilled workers and has no skilled workers (we relax this assumption in Section 6). The two countries also di¤er in the technological capabilities to produce existing intermediates (Krugman, 1979) : new technologies are introduced in the West and can be transferred to the East only after paying a …xed o¤shoring cost. As in earlier models of directed technical change (see, e.g, Acemoglu, 2002) , some technologies complement skilled workers while others complement unskilled workers and the evolution of both is endogenous. There are no barriers to trade of goods across countries, but labor is immobile. Variables with no country index refer to the world economy.
In…nitely lived households derive utility from the consumption of a unique …nal good, and supply labor inelastically. Preferences are identical across countries and types of workers, and take a logarithmic form. In consequence, the world economy admits a representative household with preferences at time t = 0 given by
where > 0 is the discount rate. Logarithmic utility is assumed to simplify the exposition. The representative household sets a consumption plan to maximize utility, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint and a No-Ponzi game condition. The consumption plan satis…es a standard Euler equation,
where r t is the interest rate, as well as a transversality condition which takes the form
where W t is the wealth of consumers which, as we will see below, comes from their ownership of …rms in the economy. 12 In what follows, time indexes will be omitted in what follows as long as this causes no confusion. The …nal good, Y; is used for both consumption and investment. The technology to produce it is represented by a production function featuring constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between two sectors (where we suppress the distribution parameter of the CES to simplify notation):
Here Y h and Y l are tradable goods, and is the elasticity of substitution between them. Choosing Y as the numeraire, pro…t maximization yields the following inverse demand functions:
where P l and P h are the world prices of Y l and Y h , respectively. Naturally, we also have 13 Production in each of the two sectors requires intermediates, which are in turn manufac- (8) below, and As;t is the range of active intermediates in sector s. 1 3 Since Y is the numeraire, we also have P
tured by workers. In particular, the production of intermediates used to make Y l and Y h , require, respectively, unskilled and skilled workers. The production technologies of the two sectors are represented by the following Dixt-Stiglitz production functions:
where x l;i (resp., x h;i ) is the quantity of intermediate
, and 1= (1 ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two of them. As in models of horizontal innovation (e.g., Romer, 1990 , see Gancia and Zilibotti, 2005 , for a survey), the measures of intermediates, A l and A h , represents the state of technology in the two sectors which grows endogenously over time. The terms
and
are technological spillovers introduced to guarantee that the model has balanced growth properties for any . 14 Pro…t maximization yields the following inverse demand functions:
where p l;i (p h;i ) is the price of the intermediate variety i; where i 2 [0;
Each intermediate is produced by a single monopolist using a constant returns to scale technology using labor as sole input:
where l i (h i ) is the quantity of unskilled (skilled) labor employed and Z 1. Since the demand features a constant elasticity equal to 1= (1 ), pro…t maximizing …rms charge prices equal to a markup 1= over the the respective marginal cost: p h;i = (w h =Z) = and p l;i = w l;w = , for varieties produced in the West, and p l;i = w l;e = for varieties produced in the East, where w h denotes the high-skill wage, and w l;c denotes the low-skill wage in country c 2 fe; wg. As a result, pro…ts are a fraction (1 ) of the value of sales:
Equilibrium with Exogenous Technology
In this subsection, we consider the wage e¤ects of o¤shoring for an exogenous level of technology (A l ; A h ). As in Krugman (1979) , we assume that the West can produce the entire measure of existing intermediates, while the East can only produce a fraction < L e =(L e + L w ) < 1 of them. The restriction that < guarantees that wages are lower in the East, so that o¤shoring production to the East, when technologically feasible, is also pro…table for Western …rms. This assumption also implies that a …rm that can o¤shore will not produce in the West. It follows that in equilibrium a measure A l of …rms produce in the East and the remaining measure (1 ) A l in the West. Note that both the extent of o¤shoring, , and the skill bias of technology, taken as exogenous here, will be endogenized in the next section (which will also guarantee that < ).
Imposing labor market clearing and using the fact that all …rms of a given type are identical, we can solve for the quantity produced of any intermediate in the West and the East as:
Next, using (7), we obtain the East-West low-skill wage gap:
where it is evident that < implies that w l;w > w l;e . As production is relocated to the East (i.e, as goes up), the demand for unskilled workers falls in the West and increases in the East, thereby compressing the wage gap. Note that conditional on the elasticity of substitution between unskilled workers in the West and East is also 1= (1 ). Substituting (9) into (5), and using (6), we can express the world production of the low-skill good as:
is a weighted average of the East's and the West's endowments of unskilled workers, with weighs depending on the o¤shoring rate. As in standard models of horizontal innovation, equation (11) shows that production increases linearly in the number of existing varieties, A l . More interestingly, for a given number of varieties, equation (12) shows that production increases in the extent of o¤shoring:
where lim !0 dL=d = 1 and lim ! dL=d = 0: We refer to this as the e¢ ciency e¤ ect of o¤shoring: an increase in induces an e¢ ciency-enhancing reallocation of production towards countries where wages are lower. In terms of the production of Y l , this is equivalent to an increase in the world factor endowment ranging fromL = L w ; when ! 0, toL = L w + L e ; when ! . Importantly, the e¢ ciency e¤ect is stronger when wages in the East are lower, i.e., when there is little o¤shoring (low ) and when the East has a large relative endowment of unskilled workers (high L e =L w ). This is intuitive in view of the fact that the e¢ ciency e¤ect exploits the wage gap between East and West, which is inversely related to . 15 Consider, next, the skill-intensive sector. Substituting into (5) the expression of x h given in (9) and using (6) yields:
For future reference, it is useful to rewrite the expression of pro…ts given by (8), using (6), (7), (9), (11) and (13):
l;e = (1 ) P lL 1 L e :
Offshoring and Wages with Exogenous Technology
We are now in the position to study the e¤ect of the level of o¤shoring on wages in the West. We consider, …rst, the e¤ect of changes in on the skill premium, and then on the high-and low-skill wage levels. Denote the skill premium in the West by ! w w h;w =w l;w . Constant markups then imply that ! w = Z (p h;w =p l;w ). Using (4), (7), (9), (11) , and (13) we obtain:
where, recall,L is an increasing function of : The …rst equation shows that the skill premium is increasing in the relative price (P h =P l ) and the relative aggregate demand (Y h =Y l ) for skillintensive products, and decreasing in relative …rm size (x h;w =x l;w ). The expression in the second line shows that the impact of changes in o¤shoring (i.e., an increase in ) on the skill
The expression of the derivative shows that relocating production from the West to the East lowers the production cost of Y l by a factor proportional to the wage gap between the two countries. premium can be decomposed into a labor supply e¤ect, (L w = (1 )) 1 , a relative price e¤ect, (H=L) 1= , and an e¢ ciency e¤ect,L 1 . The …rst two e¤ects increase the skill premium, whereas the third one reduces it.
We now discuss each e¤ect in more detail. First, o¤shoring displaces Western unskilled workers who must be rehired by the remaining domestic …rms. Holding prices (P h =P l ) constant, this is analogue to an increase in the supply of unskilled workers in the West which in turn increases the skill premium. Second, o¤shoring increases low-skill production, raising the relative price of the skill-intensive goods. This relative price e¤ect also increases the skill premium. Third, o¤shoring raises the overall e¢ ciency of low-skill production, reducing Y h =Y l . The increase in the relative demand for the unskilled product raises the demand for the o¤-shored factor in the West. The e¤ect is stronger when the complementarity between unskilled workers in the West and the East is greater (low ) and when the initial level of o¤shoring is lower.
An inspection of (15) shows that the e¢ ciency e¤ect is dominated by the price e¤ect whenever > (i.e., 1 < 1= ). That is, if the elasticity of substitution between intermediates produced in the East and in the West (or between unskilled workers in the East and in the West) is greater than the elasticity of substitution between high-and low-skill workers, then o¤shoring necessarily increases the skill premium in the West. Given the estimates of elasticities in the empirical literature, this case seems empirically plausible and will be the one we emphasize in the rest of the paper. 16 If, instead, intermediates were more complementary than high-and low-skill workers ( < or 1 > 1= ), then the e¢ ciency e¤ect would dominate the price e¤ect. Whether it would also dominate the labor-supply e¤ect depends on the level of o¤shoring. Since lim !0 dL=d = 1, for su¢ ciently low levels of , the e¢ ciency e¤ect is so strong that o¤shoring raises the relative reward to the o¤shored factor. For su¢ ciently high levels of o¤shoring, however, only the labor-supply e¤ect remains (recall, lim ! dL=d = 0). The relationship between ! w and in the two cases is depicted in Figure 1 .
The e¢ ciency e¤ect is similar to the productivity e¤ect of trade in tasks in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In their model, o¤shoring requires a per-unit cost which varies across tasks, there is no substitutability across tasks and the foreign wage is exogenously given. Under these assumptions, they show that a fall in o¤shoring costs increases the "e¤ective productivity" of the o¤shored factor and in some cases its wage. Our results di¤er in three important respects. First, by taking into account the general equilibrium adjustment of Eastern wages to the higher demand for their services, our model suggests that the e¢ ciency e¤ect becomes endogenously weaker as more o¤shoring takes place and will eventually vanish once wages have converged worldwide. Second, di¤erently from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), our model allows for substitutability between intermediates, and shows that the extent of such substitution, as captured by the elasticity of substitution between intermediates, changes the strength of the e¢ ciency e¤ect. In fact, our results show that assuming no task/intermediate substitutability, as in several existing models of o¤shoring, might provide only a partial picture of the implications of o¤shoring.
Third, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) emphasize the bene…cial e¤ect of a reduction in the unit cost of o¤shoring on all o¤shored tasks (intensive margin), while we focus on the bene…t of o¤shoring additional intermediates and tasks (the extensive margin). In both cases, the e¢ ciency/productivity e¤ect exists, but its determinants are di¤erent.
In the rest of this section, we study the e¤ect of o¤shoring on wage levels. It is easy to establish that wages of both high-skill workers and low-skill Eastern workers increase unambiguously with o¤shoring (see Proposition 1 and its proof below). The behavior of the wage of low-skill workers in the West is more complex and deserves some discussion. It is also especially interesting since the e¤ect of o¤shoring on low-skill wages in the West is the subject of an intense debate.
In the model with exogenous technology discussed in this section, o¤shoring always reduces low-skill wages when the initial level of o¤shoring is high (i.e., as ! ). But its impact at low initial level of o¤shoring is ambiguous. More formally, the low-skill wage is given by
Using (3), (4), (6), (9), (11) and (13) yields:
The e¤ect of on w l;w can again be decomposed into a relative price e¤ ect, an e¢ ciency e¤ ect and a labor supply e¤ect. The interpretation is similar to the discussion above concerning the skill premium: o¤shoring decreases the low-skill wage via the price and labor supply e¤ects, whereas it increases w l;w via the e¢ ciency e¤ect. Standard algebra (see the proof of Proposition 1 below) establishes that an increase in necessarily lowers w l;w when (i) > (i.e., 1 < 1= ) and (ii)
We have argued above that > is the empirically relevant case. Condition (17) is also plausible. For example, in the US economy the ratio of college to high-school graduates is greater than one and the skill premium greater than 1.5. With ! w H=L w = 1:5 and = 1:6, o¤shoring necessarily lowers the real wage of unskilled workers in the West whenever the elasticity of substitution across varieties is greater than 2:66, a value comfortably below the empirical estimates in the trade literature (see footnote 16). Thus, under two conditions that we regard as empirically realistic, low-skill wages are uniformly decreasing with o¤shoring. The relationship between o¤shoring and the three wage levels is depicted in Figure 2 for the relatively conservative case = 1:6 and = 3:33.
When either < or condition (17) is reversed, then the relationship between o¤shoring and low-skill wages is hump shaped. In particular, as ! ; dL=d ! 0; both the price and the e¢ ciency e¤ects vanish, and dw l;w =d < 0; unambiguously. However, as ! 0, dL=d ! 1; and the sign of the total e¤ect turns positive.
The next proposition summarizes the impact of o¤shoring with exogenous technology on the skill premium in the West and wages in the West and the East (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 With exogenous technology, an increase in o¤ shoring, parameterized by : increases the skill premium, ! w , if > (i.e., if the elasticity of substitution between intermediates is greater than the elasticity of substitution between skills); decreases the skill premium, ! w , for low initial values of and increases the skill premium for high initial values of if < ; increases the real wage of skilled workers in the West, w h;w , and the real wage of unskilled workers in the East, w l;e ; decreases the real wage of unskilled workers in the West, w l;w ; if > and ! w H w =L w > =( ); where ! w is given by (15) . Otherwise, its impact on w l;w is hump-shaped: it increases w l;w for low initial values of , and decreases w l;w for high initial values of :
In the rest of the paper, we characterize the e¤ects of o¤shoring opportunities on technology. Our analysis characterizes these e¤ects for all values of the various elasticities of substitution, but in light of the discussion above, we emphasize the empirically relevant case where > .
Endogenous Offshoring and Technology
In this section, we endogenize technical change and o¤shoring, focusing on balanced growth paths (BGP). Transitional dynamics will be studied in the next section.
We assume that innovation is subject to a …xed cost ; assumed for simplicity to be the same in both the high-and low-skill sector. In addition, by paying an additional set-up cost, f , a …rm has the option to o¤shore the production of its variety to a partner …rm in the East. However, in this case the Western …rm only appropriates a share~ 1 of the pro…t ‡ow (all our results apply when~ = 1). This can be motivated by a variety of contractual imperfections, for example by assuming that the o¤shoring …rm is subject to a hold up problem forcing it to transfer part of its pro…ts to a partner company in the East or has only imperfect IPR protection.
Let V h be the value of a skill-intensive …rm. This value must satisfy the usual Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
In words, the instantaneous return from owning the …rms is equal to the pro…t rate plus any capital gain or losses. Similarly, let V o l be the value of a …rm that has paid the o¤shoring cost, and V l the value of a low-skill …rm that produces in the West. These value functions are determined by the following HJB equations:
The max operator in the …rst HJB equation takes into account the fact that the …rm will produce in the most pro…table location. Typically, a …rm that has paid the o¤shoring cost will …nd optimal to produce in the East, thus,~ l;e > l;w : The max operator in the second HJB equation captures the option for the non-o¤shored …rm to pay the cost f; o¤shore its production, and change its value to V o l . Free-entry implies that the value of introducing a new intermediate and the value of o¤shoring the production of an existing intermediate cannot exceed their respective costs:
In a BGP with positive innovation and o¤shoring, all free-entry conditions must hold as equalities, so that
These conditions, together with the HJB equations above, pin down the BGP interest rate:
As we now show, this equation, which requires the return from o¤shoring and from any innovations to be equalized, determines the BGP level of o¤shoring ( ) and the skill-bias of technology (A h =A l ).
To …nd the BGP level of o¤shoring, let us de…ne ~ =(f = +1), which varies between zero and one, and can be interpreted as an index of "o¤shoring opportunities". The …rst equality in (21) implies that l;e = l;w . Substituting in the expressions of pro…ts given by (14) yields the BGP level of o¤shoring as a function of :
Intuitively, better IPR (~ ) and lower o¤shoring costs (f ), i.e., a higher , and a greater supply of labor in the East (L e ) make o¤shoring more attractive. Substituting (22) into (10) and (12) yields the BGP East-West wage gap and the e¤ective world labor supply of unskilled workers:
To determine the direction of technical change, we next turn to the relative BGP value of innovation in the two sectors. First note that (18) , (19) and (20) together imply that V h =V l = h = l . Then, substituting pro…ts from (14) yields:
where the last equality follows by substituting for P h =P l from (4) and then using (11) and (13) .
As in the canonical model of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002) , the relative value for new innovations depends on a price and on a market size e¤ect. However, the market size e¤ect here takes a novel form: while the market size for skill-complementary innovations is simply H, the e¤ective market size in the other sector depends on L w , L e and the extent of o¤shoring, . Consider now the e¤ect of an increase in (which also increases ) on the direction of technical change to illustrate these price and market size e¤ects. First, the improvement in the allocation of labor worldwide leads (via an increase inL) to an increase in the production of the low-skill good, Y l . This raises the relative price of the high-skill good and increases the relative pro…tability of high-skill innovation. In other words, it induces a price e¤ ect favoring skill biased technologies. Second, the increase in also triggers two di¤erent types of market size e¤ects. On the one hand, as more tasks and sectors are o¤shored to the East, each lowskill intermediate still produced in the US employs more workers and is produced in greater quantity. We refer to this e¤ect, which favors unskill-biased technologies in response to greater o¤shoring, as a direct market size e¤ ect. This e¤ect is captured in (23) by the term Lw 1 and is clearly increasing in and thus in . On the other hand, an increase in also raisesL, raising the total market size of unskill-biased technologies. Intuitively, the market size depends (for given prices of the …nal goods and the size of the production of each …rm in the US) on how e¢ ciently the labor force is allocated worldwide. Increasing the e¢ ciency of the allocation yields a larger e¤ective market size. The extent of the complementarity across intermediates is crucial for this e¤ect. As ! 1, the intermediates are perfect substitutes, and the e¤ective market size becomes independent ofL: Conversely, this e¤ect is maximized when is small, and intermediates are highly complementary. We refer to this novel e¤ect as a complementary market size e¤ ect.
Imposing the BGP technology market clearing condition, V l = V h , into (23) yields the BGP ratio of technologies:
where
When > , (25) is positive for small values of , because in this case the price e¤ect is strong and the market size e¤ect is limited (recall that d lnL=d ! 1 as ! 0). It turns negative for high values of because now the direct market size e¤ect is more pronounced (recall that d lnL=d ! 0 as ! ). We de…ne, for future reference, the threshold value^ such that, at this threshold, (25) is equal to zero (recall that is monotonically increasing in ) as:^
; which is monotonically decreasing in : Intuitively,^ is the threshold value of such that, if <^ (resp., ^ ),
. Note that a lower strengthens the price e¤ect, which tends to induce skill-biased technical change, and thus implies a higher^ . The relationship between the BGP level of A h =A l and for the case > and two plausible values of is represented in Figure 3 .
To better understand the intuition for the hump-shaped pattern of Figure 3 , recall that, as discussed above, the e¤ect of an increase of onL becomes very large as ! 0, and vanishes as ! : Since the direct market size e¤ect does not vanish as ! ; it dominates all other e¤ects when is large. This guarantees that a reduction in o¤shoring costs leads unambiguously to unskill-bias technical change (UBTC) when is large (su¢ ciently close to ). When is small, we have the converse situation where the direct market size e¤ect becomes negligible relative to the e¤ects operating throughL (i.e., the price e¤ect and the complementary market size e¤ect). However, since these two e¤ects work in opposite directions, their net impact is still ambiguous. When > , as shown in the …gure, the price e¤ect is large and dominates the complementary market size e¤ect. In this case, the increase in o¤shoring (or o¤shoring opportunities) generates a race between the price e¤ect (net of the complementary market size e¤ect) that pulls towards skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and the direct market size e¤ect that pushes towards UBTC. When wages in the East are low, the e¤ect of more o¤shoring opportunities is a large increase in the aggregate production of low-skill goods (Y l ), causing a signi…cant increase in the relative price of high-skill good. Thus o¤shoring induces SBTC in this case. On the contrary, when wages in the East are already high, the e¤ect of o¤shoring opportunities on Y l is limited, and is dominated by the fact that each low-skill …rm in the US employs more workers and serves a larger market. Thus, over this range, o¤shoring induces UBTC. This pattern contrasts with the case where < , which involves the price e¤ect being dominated by the complementary market size e¤ect. In this case, an increase in unambiguously induces UBTC. As Figure 3 shows, the e¤ect of o¤shoring on the skill bias of technology can be signi…cant, particularly when the elasticity of substitution between intermediates is high (dashed line). It is useful to compare these results with those obtained in models focusing on the impact of trade on the direction of technological progress, such as Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia, Muller and Zilibotti (2011) . In those models, the equation for the relative pro…tability of skill-complement innovations, (23), simpli…es to:
where H and L are the relevant endowments. This corresponds to the autarky equilibrium in the present model. The e¤ect of trade integration on the relative pro…tability of high-and low-skill innovation depends then on assumptions about the total skill endowment in the freetrade equilibrium and the extent of international protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Consider the opening to trade of a large skill-scarce country. Without global IPR, the market size for new technologies does not change. Then, the only e¤ect will be an increase in the world price of skill-intensive products (P h =P l ), which will induce SBTC. With global IPR protection, the market size dominates the price e¤ect and the larger endowment of unskilled workers in the world economy would make it pro…table to invest in UBTC. When > , our model of o¤shoring nests these two extreme scenarios and predicts an endogenous switch from SBTC to UBTC as integration increases. The reason is that the relative strength of the price e¤ect varies with the level of o¤shoring: it dominates when wages in the East are low and the e¢ ciency e¤ect is strong, but it disappears as more o¤shoring eliminates the cost di¤erences between the East and the West. What are the implications for the skill premium in the West? Substituting (24) into (15), we can …nd the BGP skill premium as:
In the extreme cases of prohibitive o¤shoring costs (implying = 0) and zero o¤shoring costs (implying = ), the skill premium is a function of the relative endowment of skilled labor in the West and in the entire world, respectively:
As in standard models of directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002) , the relationship between the skill premium and the relative supply of skill is increasing whenever > 2. In intermediate cases where 2 (0; 1), the e¤ect of o¤shoring on the skill premium is generally non-monotonic and depends crucially on and . This can be seen by di¤erentiating (27) with respect to :
For low levels of o¤shoring, the e¢ ciency e¤ect (L) is the dominant force. Focusing again on the case > , the skill premium will increase with for two reason. The …rst is the static e¤ect presented in the previous section. The second reason is the induced SBTC which we have just discussed. For high levels of o¤shoring ( ! 1), however, the e¢ ciency e¤ect disappears (
= 0) and UBTC tends to lower wage inequality. Equation (28) then shows that the skill premium will fall with whenever > 1 (i.e., > 1 ). This implies that when 1 < < (i.e.,
), the long-run relationship between ! w and is inverse U-shaped. Note also that this outcome is more likely when substitutability between L-complement intermediates is high (i.e., high ). If the elasticity of substitution between varieties, , is equal to 5 (which is in the ballpark of the elasticities of substitution across intermediates in the trade literature, see footnote 16), the inverted U-shape holds for 2 (1:25; 5), which includes the range of consensus estimates of the elasticity of substitution between skill groups. The same conclusion continues to apply even with a conservative value of = 3, which implies the inverted U-shape applies for 2 (1:5; 2:9) : 17 1 7 In contrast, if were lower than 0.5 ( < 2), the opposite case could also arise:
, then the relationship between !w and would be U-shaped instead of inverted U-shaped. However, the parameter Figure 4 shows the relationship between the skill premium and o¤shoring for = 1:6 and = 3:33. The monotonic schedule (dased line) is obtained by holding technology constant at the autarky level, while the black line represents the BGP skill premium with endogenous skill bias. As the …gure makes clear, the endogenous reaction of technology provides a strong ampli…cation of the impact of o¤shoring on the skill premium for low levels of integration, while this e¤ect is reverted for high levels of o¤shoring. 18 Thus, the combination of o¤shoring together with directed technical change can explain a large surge in the skill premium even for low levels of trade between the West and the East.
Finally, let us turn to the e¤ect of o¤shoring on innovation and growth in the long run. The Euler equation for consumption, g = r ; links the BGP interest rate and growth rate. The interest rate is uniquely pinned down by the free-entry condition for innovation, r = h = . Substituting for h from (14) and using (3), (4), (11) , (13) and (22) yields:
Since dL=d > 0, an increase in o¤shoring opportunities ( ) increases the BGP interest rate and thus the BGP growth rate. Usual arguments then establish that consumption, Y , Y h , condition for this to be the case does not seem very realistic. 1 8 The pattern presented in Figure 3 also suggests that the ampli…cation e¤ect would be even stronger for higher, but still plausible, values of . Y l , A h and A l all grow at the common rate g, which is strictly positive provided that < min fL w ; ZH w g. 19 The next proposition summarizes the main results of this section (proof in the text).
Proposition 2 Suppose > > 1 and < min fL w ; ZH w g. Then there exists a unique BGP with growth g > 0. In this BGP, an increase in o¤ shoring opportunities, parameterized by :
increases the o¤ shoring rate, ; increases the equilibrium interest rate, r, and the growth rate, g; induces a hump-shaped response in the skill bias of technology [i.e., it induces SBTC, or higher A h =A l , for low initial , and UBTC, or lower A h =A l , for high initial ]; increases the skill premium, ! w , if 1 > , and induces a hump-shaped reaction in the skill premium, ! w , if > 1 [i.e., it increases ! w for low initial , and decreases ! w for high initial ]; reduces the wage gap between unskilled workers in the East and in the West, w l;e =w l;w .
This proposition thus summarizes the rich pattern of interactions between o¤shoring and the endogenous direction of technology. Greater o¤shoring opportunities …rst induce SBTC and tend to raise wage inequality, but will ultimately induce UBTC and, in this case, will limit or even reduce inequality. Figure 4 above, which also plots the relationship between o¤shoring and wage inequality with endogenous technology, illustrates that the non-monotonic relationship is indeed driven by the endogenous response of technology.
Proposition 2 is stated under the assumption that > which we argued above to be the empirically relevant case. For completeness, we state the analogous results in Proposition 4 for the case of < in the Appendix. As discussed in the text, the main di¤erences are that, in the low-case, an increase in o¤shoring opportunities necessarily induces UBTC, and generates either a U-shaped response or a monotonically decreasing response in the skill premium
Transitional Dynamics
In this section, we consider the implications of a small (unexpected) increase in o¤shoring opportunities (henceforth, an o¤ shoring shock ) on the entire equilibrium path of the economy. As A l and A h grow at the rate g, and r = + g > g, this is automatically satis…ed in the unique candidate BGP.
To simplify the discussion, we assume that before the shock the economy is in the BGP. The shock may be caused by either an increase in~ or a decrease in f: This shock increases the BGP o¤shoring rate, ; and also impacts the skill bias of technology as indicated in Proposition 2. The next proposition characterizes the transitional dynamics of , A h and A l : A formal proof and a complete characterization of the dynamical system is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Suppose > , the economy is initially in the pre-shock BGP, and there is a (positive) o¤ shoring shock at time t = 0. Then, the dynamic equilibrium path converges in …nite time to a new BGP with a higher o¤ shoring rate. Moreover: (i) If <^ (where^ de…ned in (26)), then the o¤ shoring shock induces a two-stage transition whereby, for some T andT such that 0 < T <T < 1; we have: (stage 1) _ t > 0; _ A l;t = _ A h;t = 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; (stage 2, SBTC) _ t > 0; _ A h;t > 0, and _ A l;t = 0 for all t 2 [T;T ]: The economy attains the new BGP at t =T : In new BGP, the technology is more skill biased, i.e., A h =A l is higher, than in the initial BGP.
(ii) If >^ , then the o¤ shoring shock induces a two-stage transition such that for some T andT (0 < T <T < 1), we have: (stage 1) _ t > 0; _ A l;t = _ A h;t = 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; (stage 2, UBTC) _ t = 0; _ A h;t = 0, and _ A l;t > 0 for all t 2 [T;T ]: The economy attains the new BGP at t =T : In the new BGP, the technology is less skill biased, i.e., A h =A l is lower, than in the initial BGP.
Upon impact, the increase in triggers a wave of o¤shoring investments, which in turn causes a discrete increase in the interest rate. The initial stage of the transition which goes on over to interval [0; T ] (stage 1) features a continuous increase in (hence, V o l V l = f ) but no innovation. The intuition for why innovation is temporarily paused is as follows: o¤shoring opportunities cause the interest rate to jump up, and at this higher interest rate, we have both V h < and V l < , making innovation unpro…table. Nevertheless, the increasing o¤shoring rate ultimately restores the pro…tability of innovation, so that either V h or V l starts holding again with equality, at which point innovation restarts.
Which type of innovation is restored at this point depends on the initial . As discussed above, if o¤shoring was initially low (i.e., if <^ ), the price e¤ect dominates the market size e¤ect, and the shock triggers SBTC. 20 More formally, in the second stage of the transition we have V o l V l = f; V h = and V l < ; and consequently, there is both o¤shoring and high-skill innovation, but no low-skill innovation. Over time, the price adjustment reduces the gap between h and l , and the economy eventually attains the new BGP where low-skill innovation is also restored. On the contrary, if o¤shoring was initially high ( >^ ), the market size e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect, and the shock triggers UBTC in the second stage of the transition (more formally, V o l V l = f; V l = and V h < ): Note that in this case reaches the new BGP level already at the end of the …rst stage of the transition. During stage 2, o¤shoring continuous but the o¤shoring rate, , remains constant.
Changes in the o¤shoring rate and technology a¤ect wages in both the West and the East. During the …rst stage, characterized by no innovation and a steep increase in o¤shoring, the wage di¤erential between low-skill workers in the West and East shrinks. The absolute level of the low-skill wage in the West also typically falls during this stage. 21 The wage of skilled workers, instead, goes up. During the second stage, the wage dynamics depend on the nature of technical change as described in Proposition 2. 22 In particular, it shows how the wages of the di¤erent types of workers (from top to bottom, high-and low-skill in the West, and low-skill workers in the East) evolve over time during the transition relative to the counterfactual wage dynamics under no shock (dashed lines). The high-skill wage is in both cases higher than in the no-shock counterfactual throughout the whole transition. The low-skill wage in the West exhibits, in both cases, a U-shaped transitional dynamics. In Panel a where the second stage of the transition (t 2 [T;T ]) is characterized by SBTC, the low-skill wage remains below the no-shock counterfactual throughout the whole transition. In Panel b where the second stage is characterized by UBTC, it surpasses the no-shock counterfactual at the end of the transition. Finally, the low-skill wage in the East is signi…cantly higher with the o¤shoring shock than without.
In all cases we know from Proposition 2 that the new BGP has a higher growth rate, and this implies that all workers will earn higher wages in a su¢ ciently far future. In consequence, low-skill workers in the West may face a trade-o¤ between short-run wage losses and long-run wage gains. The welfare consequences of the increase in o¤shoring and the resolution of this trade-o¤ are discussed in the next section.
Welfare Analysis
In this section, we study the welfare e¤ects of the o¤shoring shock discussed in the previous section. We compute the discounted utility of di¤erent types of agents. Using the Euler equation (1), agent i's discounted utility evaluated at time t = 0 can be written as:
The initial consumption, C i;0 , can be found by combining the Euler equation and the lifetime budget constraint:
where w i;t is agent i's wage and a i;0 is the value of his asset holdings at t = 0. The welfare e¤ect of the o¤shoring shock can be decomposed into an impact e¤ect, i.e., the instantaneous jump in the level of consumption C i;0 , and a growth e¤ect, including both the e¤ect of the change in the growth rate during transition and on the new BGP. The o¤shoring shock a¤ects C i;0 by changing both the present value of wages and the value of the initial assets. To understand the latter, note that the only assets in positive net supply in the economy are claims to the pro…t ‡ow of existing …rms. The present value of …rm j evaluated at time t = 0 is given by:
Along a BGP, V j;0 = . However, during the …rst stage of the transition where there is only o¤shoring and no innovation, we have V j;0 < , and so the o¤shoring shock causes a capital loss to asset owners by increasing the world interest rate. In the no-shock counterfactual, discounted utility at t = 0 along the old BGP would instead be given by U i;0 = (ln C i;0 + g 0 = )= ; where C i;0 = w i;t + a i;0 and starred variables denote BGP values assuming no o¤shoring shock.
Since there are no closed form solutions for the transitional wage and interest rate trajectories, in this section we rely on numerical analysis. 23 We calibrate the model economy so as to be broadly consistent with some salient facts of the recent development of the global economy. We identify the West with the US and the East with China, the two largest economies among the industrializing and emerging markets as well as the most important actors in the process of globalization and technology o¤shoring. We normalize the size of the unskilled labor in the West to L w = 1. The labor force of China is set to L e = 4:7; to match the average relative size of the Chinese urban labor force over the last decade. 24 We set H w = 1:2 so as to match the relative skill endowment (as measured by the share of workers with college degree or more) in the US in 2000. We set the elasticity of substitution between high-and low-skill workers to = 1:6, consistent with the estimates reported by Ciccone and Peri (2005) . Since the overwhelming majority of estimates of the elasticity of substitution between traded goods is greater than 3 (see footnote 16), we consider two possible values for this parameter: = 3:33 (corresponding to = 0:7) and = 5 (corresponding to = 0:8). Crucially, in both cases, we have > > 1 ; so the BGP responses of the skill premium to is hump-shaped (see Proposition 2). Finally, we set = 0:04 which, when combined with a 2% long-run growth rate, implies a rate of return on equity about 6%, which is in the ballpark of the return on equity in post-war US. The initial o¤shoring cost parameter, f , and the parameter Z are set to match, respectively, the PPP-adjusted wage gap between Chinese and low skill US workers (w l;e =w l;w = 0:16), and the skill premium in the US (! w = 1:9) in year 2000. 25 This yields 0 = 0:01 and Z = 1:65 in the case of = 0:7; and 0 = 0:0005 and Z = 1:49 in the case of = 0:8: In order to generate the wage gap between the US and China, the model requires signi…cant technological di¤erences, which in the context of our model implies high o¤shoring costs (since o¤shoring closes the technology di¤erences).
The innovation cost, ; is chosen to ensure that the post-shock equilibrium annual BGP 2 3 Unless otherwise stated, the calibration described in this section was also used to produce all the …gures in the paper. 2 4 The average size of the unskilled US labor force is 61 millions. This is derived from the total number of non-agricultural workers in the US, which is 135 millions (source: Current Population Survey). Of these, 61 millions are classi…ed as unskilled ("high school graduates or less") and 74 millions are classi…ed as skilled ("some college or more") workers. The average number of urban workers in China over the last decade is 286 millions (source: China Statistial Yearbook). Consistent with the model, we make the simplifying assumption that all Chinese workers are employed in the low-skill sector (see the next section for a generalization where we allow o¤shoring to the high-skill sector). 2 5 The wage gap is calculated using the ratio between the average wage in the US and the average urban wage in China (from the China Statistical Yearbook). This is adjusted to yield the ratio between the average Chinese urban wage and the low skill wage in the US (own calculation). The PPP is from the Penn World Table. The US skill premium is from Acemoglu and Autor (2010). growth rate is equal to the average growth rate of the US economy between 1950 and 2010, approximately 2%. Motivated by the recent slowdown in the world growth rates, we also consider an alternative low-growth scenario where is larger and consistent with a 1% annual growth rate, close to the average growth rate of the US economy between 1995 and 2010 (all growth rates from the Penn World Table 7 .1).
Finally, welfare e¤ects also depend on the initial asset distribution. Since observing the exact asset holdings of di¤erent types of workers is challenging, for this exercise we assume that the initial share of world assets held by each group of workers is proportional to the present value of their wages in the initial BGP. This assumption implies that before the o¤shoring shock high-and low-skill workers in the West own, respectively, 56.5% and 24.8% of the world assets, while Chinese workers own 18.6% of world assets. For simplicity, we also set~ = 1 (full IPR protection) so that we do not have to consider pro…t stealing, and let the o¤shoring shock take the form of a reduction in f .
The size of the o¤shoring shock is chosen to generate an increase in the skill premium in the West comparable to the empirical observation for the US between 2000-08. 26 Consistent with the results in Proposition 3, with both = 0:7 and = 0:8, the transitional dynamics feature a pure o¤shoring stage followed by a stage in which there is SBTC.
In Table 1 , we report the e¤ect of the o¤shoring shock on the relative wage in China (w l;e =w l;w ), the growth rate (g) and on welfare of all workers, expressed as the equivalent change in their level of consumption in the old BGP ( c h;w , c l;w and c l;e ). The …rst four columns refer to the case of = 0:7, and show that the e¤ect of the increase in o¤shoring on wages in China is quite signi…cant. In all four cases, wage of Chinese workers relative to US unskilled workers grows from the initial level of 0.16 to 0.22. This is approximately 43% of the catch-up observed between 2000 and 2008, indicating that, according to our model, o¤shoring of Western technology to China accounts for close to half of Chinese wage growth during this recent period.
In column (1) we consider the benchmark 2% growth scenario, in which o¤shoring increases the BGP growth rate of the world economy from 1.8% to 2%. The last three rows of the table show that the shock has important distributional e¤ects. 27 In particular, Chinese workers gain considerably (+32%), followed by the skilled workers in the US (+10%). Unskilled workers in the West also gain, but only a modest +1.8%. In column (2) we consider the same experiment in the alternative low-growth scenario where o¤shoring increases the BGP growth rate of the world economy from 0.83% to 1%. In this case, all welfare gains are smaller and unskilled workers in the US start to lose out. The fact that gains are smaller when the growth potential of the world economy is lower is a re ‡ection of the long-run complementarity between innovation and o¤shoring we mentioned in the introduction. Recall that o¤shoring increases the BGP growth rate, and in addition, a high innovation potential speeds up the transition so that the long-run bene…ts from o¤shoring materialize faster.
The welfare results highlighted thus far are partly driven by the e¤ect of o¤shoring on growth, which is arguably unrealistic. In columns (3) and (4), we neutralize the growth e¤ect by changing simultaneously the cost of o¤shoring (f ) and of innovation ( ) so as to keep the BGP growth rate constant before and after the shock. This strategy can be viewed as a way to isolate the redistributional e¤ects of technology, which is the main focus of the paper, while remaining agnostic on the determinants of long-run growth. It also captures the essence of models of semi-endogenous growth (e.g., Jones, 1995), as well as of recent models suggesting that o¤shoring may directly increase innovation costs due to, for example, coordination problems (as in Naghavi and Ottaviano, 2009). As columns (3) and (4) show, once growth e¤ects are neutralized, the welfare gains of all agents are reduced, and can turn into signi…cant losses for the unskilled workers in the US (-2.3% and -3.21% in the high-and low-growth scenarios respectively).
Columns (5)- (8) replicate the same exercises for the case = 0:8. Overall, the results are very similar, although the e¤ect of the shock on Chinese wages and welfare is slightly smaller (the wage gap of China increases from 0.16 to 0.21). As in the previous case, the Chinese gain the most, the US skilled workers also experience positive welfare gains, ranging from +7% in the most pessimistic scenario (low growth without growth e¤ects) to +10.4% in the most optimistic scenario (high growth with growth e¤ects), while unskilled workers in the US gain (marginally) only in the most optimistic scenario. We complete this section by presenting additional numerical simulations starting from higher levels of o¤shoring, i.e., higher levels of 0 . The goal of this exercise is to explore the implications of the model in a wider range of parameters-not to claim that these scenarios are relevant for what the world economy has so far experienced. Nevertheless, if o¤shoring continues to grow, these scenarios might become relevant for the future evolution of the global economy. We focus on the benchmark calibration for = 0:7; and change the initial o¤shoring rate, 0 , which yields a higher relative wage in China (28%, 40%, 50% and 60% of the unskilled wage in the US). In each experiment, the o¤shoring shock is chosen so as to generate an increase in the Chinese wage of 6 percentage points relative to the corresponding level in the US (i.e., to 34%, 46%, 56% and 66%), as it was the case in Table 1 . Finally, for the reasons discussed above and to improve comparability across experiments, we neutralize any growth e¤ect of o¤shoring by changing the cost of innovation so as to keep g = 2%. Table 2 reports the results of this exercise. It depicts the direction of technological progress along the transition (SBTC or UBTC), the Chinese wage gap (w l;e =w l;w ) and the skill premium (! w ) both before and after the transition, and the welfare e¤ect for all workers, expressed as again in consumption-equivalent changes ( c h;w , c l;w and c l;e ). Column (1) replicates column (3) in Table 1 as a benchmark for comparison. Column (2) shows that, when workers in China earn 28% of the Western wage initially, the o¤shoring shock induces SBTC, brings about a higher skill premium and hurts the unskilled workers in the US. Yet, when the initial wage in China is su¢ ciently high, as in columns (3)- (5), the shock induces UBTC, and this switch in the direction of technical change has important distributional implications favoring the unskilled workers in the US. Starting from high levels of o¤shoring, unskilled workers in the US start to gain (see columns (4) and (5)), and end up gaining even more than the skilled workers in column (5).
(1) In conclusion, the results in this section suggest that the welfare e¤ects of increased o¤-shoring are highly asymmetric. For the realistic parameter values used in Table 1 , our results suggest that low-skill workers in the West may lose even in a dynastic world (where discounted utility is the relevant criterion) with no credit market imperfections (that would prevent consumption smoothing). In models with short-lived, non-altruistic agents, or in models where agents cannot borrow against future wages, the welfare losses can become more pronounced.
An interesting implication of our analysis is that fostering innovation may be important at counterbalancing the negative distributional e¤ects of o¤shoring because losses are less likley in the high-growth scenario. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, our analysis also shows that adverse distributional e¤ects of o¤shoring may become less pronounced, or even subside, as the technological gap between China and the West declines-because of the change in the direction of technical change induced by o¤shoring.
Extensions
We now extend our benchmark model in two directions. First, we allow for o¤shoring in skillintensive intermediates/tasks. Second, we allow Eastern …rms to transfer technology from the West also by imitating Western technologies.
High-Skill Offshoring
To study the e¤ect of o¤shoring skill-intensive intermediates, we assume that the East is endowed with H e units of skilled labor, but maintain that the West is skill abundant: H w =L w > H e =L e . For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to the BGP.
It is immediate to verify that, for given technology (A h ; A l ) and o¤shoring rates ( h ; l ), the skill premia in the West and East are:
. The comparative statics of changes in ( h ; l ) follows directly from the baseline case.
More interesting results can be derived when o¤shoring is endogenous. We start from the simpler case in which o¤shoring costs are the same in the two sectors. Then, the equilibrium o¤shoring rate is pinned down by the conditions l;e = l;w and h;e = h;w : As in our benchmark model with only low-skill o¤shoring, the BGP pro…t gap between domestic and o¤shored …rms must be equal to the o¤shoring cost, 1= . Substituting in the expressions of pro…ts yields:
Since the East is skill-scarce, it is easy to see that the relative extent of o¤shoring, 1+Lw=Le as increases. Interestingly, o¤shoring is endogenously more prevalent in the low-skill sector. This is intuitive: the relative abundance of unskilled labor in the East induces Western …rms to o¤shore production relatively more in the unskilled sector. As increases, however, o¤shoring increases relatively more in the lagging skilled sector. This pattern accords well with the available evidence: for example, the volume of trade in services, which are relatively skill-intensive, is lower than the volume of trade in intermediate products, but it has recently grown at a faster rate (World Trade Report, 2008) .
Next, the indi¤erence conditions between domestic and o¤shore production in both sectors imply that the international wage gap in both sectors is given by:
It follows immediately that the skill premium is the same in both countries. This is an important result: o¤shoring generates conditional factor price equalization, even if the two countries are fully specialized and have di¤erent technological capabilities. This result is driven by the assumption that the cost of o¤shoring is the same in both sectors, which in turn implies that the value of o¤shoring, which is proportional to the East-West wage di¤erence, must also be equalized. This is accomplished by a higher o¤shoring rate in the unskilled sector, so as to increase the relative demand and hence the wage for unskilled workers in the East. The BGP skill premium, ! = ! w = ! e , is now:
The fact that H w =L w > H e =L e implies that an increase in raises both terms in parenthesis. Intuitively, o¤shoring has a larger impact in the unskilled sector because the East has a relatively larger endowment of unskilled workers. It follows that the comparative statics to changes in are similar to the baseline case. In particular, depending on the elasticities and , the relationship between and ! w is still likely to be non-monotonic. Figure 6 plots the relationship between ! and the extent of o¤shoring, ; using the calibration of Section 5. The graph shows both the previously studied case in which H e = 0 (solid line) and the case in which 10% of workers in the East are skilled (dashed line). As the …gure makes clear, adding highskill o¤shoring does not change the qualitative relationship between the skill premium in the West and o¤shoring: the shape of the two lines is similar, with the only di¤erence that, with a larger skill-endowment in the East, the e¤ect of o¤shoring on the skill premium is smaller (the red line is below the black line). Interestingly, for su¢ ciently low levels of o¤shoring, a fall in o¤shoring costs raises skill premia both in the origin and destination countries. These predictions are broadly consistent with the evidence reported in Ge and Yang (2012), who …nd The results are easily generalized to the case in which o¤shoring costs are di¤erent in the two sectors. In this case, the BGP skill premium would also vary across locations. In particular, if the cost of o¤shoring was larger for high-skill jobs ( h < l ), then there would be less H-o¤shoring, resulting in lower demand for skilled workers in the East and a lower skill premium compared to the West:
Overall, the generalized model of o¤shoring can explain why, despite its scarcity of skilled labor, the skill premium in China is lower than in the United States and why it has increased in both countries.
Imitation, Trade and Offshoring
So far, the only mode of technology transfer from West to East has been o¤shoring. In this section, we add the possibility for local …rms in the East to imitate Western technologies. Imitation is modelled as an inferior form of technology transfer: the labor productivity for producing an intermediate is lower with imitation than under o¤shoring, for example because tacit knowledge of Western …rms prevents perfect imitation. However, imitation entails no payment of monopoly rents to the innovating …rms in the West. We show that in this environment, two regimes emerge in equilibrium: as long as o¤shoring costs are su¢ ciently high, technology transfer occurs only through imitation. However, when o¤shoring costs become su¢ ciently low, o¤shoring starts prevailing and less productive local imitating …rms gradually disappear.
More speci…cally, we assume that Eastern …rms can copy existing intermediates at a small cost and become local monopolists. However, technology transfer via imitation is imperfect: imitated intermediates are produced with a worse technology, with labor productivity equal to ' < 1. There is free trade in …nal goods, Y h and Y l . Intermediates can also be traded, but foreign trade entails a small ‡ow cost to be paid independently of the quantity exported. As a result, trade in …nal goods will equalize prices in both countries and there will be no trade in individual intermediates. 28 To simplify the analysis further, in this extension we focus on the case where ' < : Then, the monopoly price charged by a …rm that o¤shores production to the East is lower than the marginal cost of a local imitator. In this case, o¤shoring would drive imitated intermediates out of business, and the equilibrium conditions of the benchmark model without imitation would continue to hold for o¤shored intermediates.
Let us now start with the benchmark without o¤shoring (but with imitation), which is similar to the world economy with trade but no IPR studied in Acemoglu (2003) . Then Eastern …rms will imitate all varieties, and there will be trade in Y h and Y l only. The relative (world) price of these goods will be:
The skill bias of the technology is determined by the incentive to innovate in the West. The relative pro…tability of skill-complementary technologies is:
Along the BGP, all types of innovations must be equally pro…table, thus V h = V l . This 2 8 The assumption of (small) trade costs, which is quite realistic, avoids complications arising from two producers being active in the same market. More formally, the equilibrium can be described by the following game. There are two producers (Eastern and Western monopolist) of the same variety. The Eastern producer has a technlogical disadvantage, but this is perfectly o¤set in equilibrium by a lower wage. The in…nitesimal trade cost keeps the two market segmented. The Eastern producer knows that, if it paid the trade cost, it would enter a stage game in the Western market in which Bertrand competition would drive pro…ts to zero. The same argument keeps the Western producer from entering the Eastern market. Therefore, in equilibrium, each producer serves the local market. See Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2012) for details. Note that we could alternatively rule out Eastern export of varieties to the West by assuming that these would constitute a violation of IPR that are protected in the West condition combined with (31) yields BGP relative technologies as:
Intuitively, in a world with no o¤shoring, imitation a¤ects the direction of technological progress in the West through the price e¤ect-there is no market size e¤ect because of lack of IPR. Better imitations (higher ') leads to greater production of unskilled goods in the East and so to a higher relative price of skilled goods. This induces SBTC. Now consider a reduction in o¤shoring costs that makes o¤shoring pro…table. In this case, there would be a switch from a BGP with only imitation to one with pure o¤shoring. To …rst determine the condition for o¤shoring to start, note that o¤shoring will be pro…table, starting from a BGP without o¤shoring, when~ o l;e l;w r f;
where o l;e denotes the pro…t of an individual Western …rm that deviates from a no-o¤shoring equilibrium and o¤shores production to the Eastern market. Such a deviating …rm can pay Eastern workers a wage that is only a fraction ' of the Western wage, and yet can use the state-of-the-art technology. l;w is the equilibrium pro…t in the West under no o¤shoring, and r = l;w = is the corresponding BGP interest rate. Thus, condition (33) ensures that starting from the BGP with only imitation, o¤shoring will be pro…table. Substituting for pro…ts, (33) can equivalently be rewritten as:
When condition (34) holds, starting from the BGP with only imitation, Western …rms will …nd it pro…table to o¤shore to the East. Let us now characterize the BGP that emerges after o¤shoring. The …rst important observation is that although in a BGP with o¤shoring only a fraction of the varieties are o¤shored, there will be no imitation in the remaining intermediates. The reason is that all Eastern producers now face higher wages: though in the BGP without o¤shoring, the technological disadvantage of the Eastern producers was o¤set by the lower wages in the East-enabling local producers with imitated technology to be active in all markets-this is no longer the case with o¤shoring, and thus low-productivity imitators in the East can no longer survive when Eastern wages are pushed up due to o¤shoring. As a result, o¤shoring induces specialization: in the new BGP, the East will export the intermediates produced in the o¤shored sectors to the West, and the West will produce and export to the East the remaining intermediates. Inferior (imitated) technologies will be abandoned altogether.
The transitional dynamics are particularly interesting. Consider an increase in triggering the transition from a BGP with only imitation to a BGP with o¤shoring. After the increase in , we will …rst have a period of o¤shoring in which, for reasons we have already discussed in Section 4, there will be no innovation. During this phase, o¤shoring will also push out low-productivity imitating …rms in the East. Interestingly, however, during this process, wages in the East do not increase until all low-productivity (imitator) …rms have exited the market. This perfectly elastic behavior of wages in the East is central for encouraging o¤shoring. Thus, equilibrium dynamics take the form of rapid growth accompanied by the reallocation of workers from low-productivity …rms to high-productivity …rms with no wage growth. The intuition for this result is related to Song et al. (2011) , who also provide evidence that this is a good description of the process of economic growth in China over the last three decades. Our economic mechanism is di¤erent however. In Song et al. (2011) , wages are kept low due to the presence of ine¢ cient state-owned enterprises and the credit market constraints slowing the expansion of private sector …rms. Here wages are kept low due to imitators and the gradual equilibrium expansion of the o¤shored sector.
The transitional dynamics enter their second phase only when all low-productivity imitators have exited the market and at this point, wages in the East start growing again. In this second phase, the rest of the transition to BGP is identical to the dynamics described in Section 4: First, there is now a stage characterized by only o¤shoring. Increasing wages in the East reduce the incentive for o¤shoring. The …rst stage of the transition is over when either skilled or unskilled innovation becomes as pro…table as o¤shoring. Then, the second stage of the transition starts, where both o¤shoring and one type of innovation coexist. Eventually, innovation is restored in both skilled and unskilled activities, and stays constant at its BGP level. Whether the second stage features SBTC or UBTC again depends on whether (24) is higher or lower than (32) evaluated at ' > 1 . The extension described in this subsection also has interesting implications about IPR policies. In the pure o¤shoring regime, better IPR in the East corresponds to a higher , and triggers technological convergence between the East and the West (and as we have emphasized, in most cases higher wage inequality in the West). The implications are reversed in the region where the equilibrium only involves imitation. In this case, stronger IPR, which correspond to a decrease in ' and thus limit the extent of imitation, also slow down technological convergence and SBTC. 29 In consequence, in the model enriched with imitation, the impact of international IPR on technological convergence (and likely on wage inequality in the West) is non-monotonic.
Conclusions
O¤shoring of jobs to low-wage countries and skill-biased technical change are among the most prominent and …ercely debated trends of the US labor market. This paper has shown how these 2 9 Moreover, in the pure imitation regime, a reduction in ' triggered by stronger IPR causes a reduction in the skill premium in the West. To see why, note that the skill premium in the West can be expressed as:
which is increasing in ':
two phenomena are likely to be strongly interlinked-because of the impact of o¤shoring on the direction of technical change. Our theoretical analysis provides several new insights on these interlinkages. Most importantly, we show that a decline in the cost of o¤shoring intermediates/tasks has in general ambiguous e¤ects on the level of wages, the skill premium and the direction of technical change. Nevertheless, our analysis clearly identi…es the contrasting e¤ects and when some dominate the others. In particular, in the most plausible scenario, starting from an equilibrium with a low volume of o¤shoring, a decline in o¤shoring costs triggers a transition characterized initially by falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West and followed by rapid skill-biased technical change. These implications highlight why, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, o¤shoring could have a major impact on wage inequality even when the extent of trade and o¤shoring is limited. They also suggest that, despite leaving out several important determinants of wage inequality in the US, our model accords fairly well with the available evidence on US labor market trends of the 1980s and early 1990s. The implications of o¤shoring are very di¤erent, however, once its volume reaches a critical level: in this case, further o¤shoring will induce unskilled-biased technical change and a lower skill premium. This suggests that the future potential distributional e¤ects of o¤shoring could be quite di¤erent than its past impact.
We also characterized the dynamics of wages and technology in the face of increasing o¤shoring. An interesting result here is that convergence to the new balance growth path equilibrium follows a stage in which o¤shoring halts innovation in the West, thus indicating that o¤shoring and innovation are substitutes in the short run. However, they turn out to be complements in the long run, in that pro…table o¤shoring tends to increase the rate of innovation in the long run, and also the welfare implications of o¤shoring are more positive when the baseline rate of innovation in the economy is greater.
Our framework further permits an investigation of the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring. Workers in the East are the clear winners because o¤shoring enables them to bene…t from better technology. Skilled workers in the West typically tend to bene…t also (though the opposite could happen), and unskilled workers could end up worse o¤, even if the future wage growth is fully factored in and consumption smoothing is allowed without any credit constraints.
Finally, the tractable nature of our framework enables several extensions, two of which we have discussed. First, we studied o¤shoring of both skilled and unskilled intermediates, which naturally leads to a pattern in which there will be greater unskilled o¤shoring, but skilled o¤shoring will also take place, at least after a while. An interesting implication of this model is a form of conditional factor price equalization-from the pro…t maximization of o¤shoring …rms. This result also implies that, in contrast to the standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem, globalization can lead to higher skill premia even in skill-scarce countries. Second, we investigated the transition of the East from low-productivity imitation to higher-productivity o¤shoring, which leads to a pattern of transition reminiscent of the Chinese process of economic growth over the last three decades, with productivity gains from reallocation associated with no wage growth.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The e¤ect of on ! w follows from (15) as discussed in the text. To establish the e¤ect of on w l;w , di¤erentiate (16) to obtain:
hence, w l;w decreases unambiguously with o¤shoring at high level of :
hence, the sign of the e¤ect depends on the sign of . Note that is positive if < (i.e., 1 > 1= ). However, if > (i.e., 1 < 1= ), then is negative provided that
Since lim !0L = L w and using (15) and 1= (1 ), this condition can be rewritten as (17) in the main text. The real wages of all other workers are w h;w = Zp h;w and w l;e = p l;e . Using (4), (6), (7), (9), (11) and (13) yields:
ZA h , and
Both w h;w and w l;e are increasing in since increases the o¤ shoring rate, ;
increases the equilibrium interest rate, r, and the growth rate, g; reduces the skill bias of technology (A h =A l ); decreases the skill premium, ! w , if 1 < ; induces a U-shaped reaction in the skill premium, ! w , if 1 > [i.e., it decreases ! w for low initial , and increases ! w for high initial ]; reduces the wage gap between unskilled workers in the East and in the West, w l;e =w l;w .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
A.3.1 Preliminary results
Lemma 1 Suppose there are no unanticipated shocks for all t s, and at t = s, V z = , with
Proof. If V z = at t = s, but V z < later, then it would imply an anticipated capital loss, violating (18) or (19) . Proof. V h = V l = and V o l V l = f are simultaneously satis…ed only for unique value of , which in turn de…nes A h =A l uniquely.
Let us also de…ne r of f ~ l;e l;w =f , r h h;w = , and r l l;w = :
Here r of f is the equilibrium interest rate when there is positive o¤shoring (it follows from V o l V l = f ); r h is the equilibrium interest rate when there is positive technical change in the skilled sector (it follows from V h = ); r l is the equilibrium interest rate when there is positive technical change in the unskilled sector (it follows from V l = ).
Finally, note that, as in Caselli and Ventura (2000) , aggregation holds in the world economy, since agents have CRRA utility, and capital markets are perfectly integrated (i.e., agents can invest their savings in both local and foreign assets). Thus agents only di¤er by their wealth and labor endowments.
A.3.2 General characterization
Given no uncertainty, no arbitrage implies that r (A h;t ; A l;t ; t ) = max fr of f ; r h ; r l g : In a BGP, r of f = r h = r l (see equation (21)). The world equilibrium path can then be described by the following system of di¤erential equations:
with boundary conditions given by 0 , A h;0 and A l;0 at t = 0 and the transversality condition (2) . Here C is the consumption of the world representative agent, and Y is the world GDP, de…ned as
where, recall,
. Consider now the impact e¤ect of a (positive) o¤shoring shock. Since l;e , l;w and h;w (and, hence, r h and r l ) are not a¤ected by changes in either f or~ , while r of f increases if either f falls or~ increases, then, upon the shock, the following condition must hold:
r (A h;t ; A l;t ; t ) = r of f > r h = r l :
Lemma 1 guarantees that o¤shoring never stops for t > 0. Thus, for all t > 0, r (A h;t ; A l;t ; t ) = r of f ; implying that r (A h;t ; A l;t ; t ) = Y (A h;t ; A l;t ; t ) A l;0L ( t )
A.3.3 The …rst stage of the transition: pure o¤ shoring
In the …rst stage of the transition, (37) implies that V o l V l = f; V h < and V l < . Then, the dynamical system, (35)-(36), simpli…es to:
f A l;0 _ t = Y (A h;0 ; A l;0 ; t ) C t (39) where 0 is pinned down by the pre-shock BGP condition, 0 = 1 + Thus, for given A l;0 , A h;0 is uniquely pin down by the BGP requirement. Next, we prove that the pure o¤shoring stage of the transition (r of f > r h and r of f > r l ) must end in …nite time, restoring positive innovation. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that this is not the case, so there is no innovation thereafter. First, we can rule out that (for any " > 0) r (A h;0 ; A l;0 ; t ) > + " for all t. If this were true, C t would grow unboundedly, which contradicts the fact that with no innovation Y (A h;0 ; A l;0 ; t ) is bounded (recall, in particular, that t , so continuous growth without innovation is not possible). This implies that, without innovation, the dynamical system must converge to a steady state with zero growth and with r (A h;0 ; A l;0 ; ) = . But r h;t > throughout, since r h;0 > and r h is increasing in , which is itself increasing along the transition path. This implies that at some point r (A h;0 ; A l;0 ; ) = r h;t , triggering skill-biased innovations, and yielding a contradiction.
We have so far established that the post-shock dynamics cannot lead to a new BGP in which there is no innovation. Next, look at whether the stage of pure o¤shoring is followed by SBTC or UBTC. Note that, during the pure o¤shoring stage of transition, r l;t r h;t = A h;0 A l;0
In general, it is ambiguous whether r l =r h is increasing or decreasing in : However, it is easy to establish that there exists^ 2 (0; ) such that (i) r l =r h is decreasing in for <^ ; (ii) r l =r h is increasing in for ^ : This can be seen from the derivative:
By assumption, 1 1= < 0. Then, the result follows form the fact that @ lnL=@ decreases monotonically from 1 at ! 0 to 0 at ! . In case (i), the pure o¤shoring stage is followed by a stage of the transition in which the equilibrium features o¤shoring and SBTC (V o l V l = f; V h = and V l < ). In case (ii), the stage of pure o¤shoring is followed by a stage in which the equilibrium features o¤shoring and UBTC (V o l V l = f; V l = and V h < ). The convergence to the new BGP must be studies separately for each of the two cases.
A.3.4 Second stage of the transition: o¤ shoring+factor biased technical change Case 1: SBTC ( <^ ) We start by pinning down the o¤shoring rate, SBT C ; that triggers a switch from pure o¤shoring to SBTC+o¤shoring ( _ t > 0; _ A h;t > 0 and _ A l;t = 0). SBT C is implicitely determined by the condition r of f = r h ; which can be rewritten as
As proven above, t will attain SBT C in …nite time. Let T > 0 denote the time in which SBTC+o¤shoring starts ( T = SBT C ). Note that T can be determined by numerical integration. For all t T , the condition r of f = r h must hold, and this yields
The equilibrium dynamics can therefore be expressed as:
for t T; with the initial condition T = SBT C : Note that equation (40) allows us to reduce the number of state variables in the dynamic system to one. Next, we show that this stage comes to an end (i.e., even the low-skill innovation is restored) in …nite time. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that the SBTC+o¤shoring stage never ends. Since , (40) implies that A h ( t ) and Y (A h ( t ) ; A l;0 ; t ) are bounded. Thus, the same argument used to prove that the stage of pure o¤shoring must end in …nite time can be used to establish that (i) if the transition featuring SBTC+o¤shoring continued forever, then r (A h ( t ) ; A l;0 ; t ) would fall to , and the economy would attain a steady state with zero growth; (ii) in converging to a steady state with zero growth, r would decline su¢ ciently to trigger unskill-biased innovations, yielding a contradiction.
In summary, the argument above establishes that there existsT < 1 such that, for t T , (where is the after-shock o¤shorability index)
to the system (41)- (42), and determine the …nite time for such a switchT .
Case 2: UBTC ( ^ ) In this case, the conditions V o l V l = f and V l = must hold simultanously, i.e., r of f = r l . But because this is the condition that determines the BGP level of o¤horing, in this stage must be at its (after-shock) BGP level (22) . Since (22) only depends on exogenous parameters, in this stage there is o¤shoring, but remains constant over time. The system of equations characterizing equilibrium simpli…es then to _ C t C t = r (A h;0 ; A l;t ; ) ;
( + f ) _ A l;t = Y (A h;0 ; A l;t ; ) C t :
This is a system of autonomous di¤erential equations in C t and A l;t ; with the initial condition A l;T = A l;0 : It is straightforward to show, as in case 1, that this transition cannot go forever, since the technology features decreasing returns to A l;t (holding constant and A h ), and thus r would fall to : However, this is impossible, and thus innovation in the skilled sector is restored in …nite time. In fact, skill-biased innovation is restored as soon as r l = r h : This occurs at t =T such that
Thereafter the BGP dynamics apply.
A.3.5 Equilibrium consumption trajectories
Full equilibrium dynamics can be characterized by solving for equilibrium consumption trajectory, and in particular for C 0 . At t =T ; consumption must be consistent with its BGP expression. In particular, the BGP expression of consumption yields
where g = In addition, for all t T , the time paths of ; A h;t and A l;t are fully determine. Note, in particular, that in case 1 A l;T = A l;0 ; and in case 2 A h;T = A h;0 ; which yields the expressions for all other variables at timeT (in terms of the BGP expressions of A h =A l ; Y =A h and Y =A l ). Given the terminal conditions fCT ; A h;T ; A l;T ; T g, the system of di¤erential equation (41)- (42) in case 1 and (43)- (44) in case 2 can be integrated backwards to yield a solution for fC T ; A h;T ; A l;T ; T g; where, recall, T is the the endpoint of the …rst stage of the transition (pure o¤shoring). Likewise, one can use fC T ; A h;T ; A l;T ; T g as the terminal condition of the …rst stage of the transition to integrate backwards the system of di¤erential equations (38)- (39) , and …nd a solution for the initial consumption, C 0 ; given the other initial conditions, A h;0 ; A l;0 ; 0 . (Recall here that A l;0 is an arbitrary initial condition, whereas A h;0 and 0 are pinned down by the initial BGP equilibrium condition).
